Flipping Houses in a Decentralized Market
Abstract. How does intermediation in the housing market affect an economy's house price distribution, trade volume, and welfare? I study flipping houses — the fast buying and reselling of houses, which has become more prevalent in recent years. While more flipping increases market thickness, it also involves intermediaries holding housing assets instead of households. To answer which effect dominates for welfare, I develop a decentralized trade model with intermediaries featuring two-sided heterogeneity in inventory and housing asset valuation, where households trade houses with each other or with flippers. Search is random, information is asymmetric, and household valuations evolve stochastically. Using a universe of administrative transaction data from Ireland, I document a steady increase in house prices, trade volume, and flipped transactions between 2012 and 2022 — in particular, the number of flipped transactions doubled. Through a calibrated model, an increase in the mass of flippers leads to a 1.5% decrease in average house prices, implying the increase in house prices in the data was not caused by flippers but by the decrease in mortgage rates. Household welfare falls on average by 0.2%, chiefly by decreasing the steady-state fraction of households owning a home; on the positive side, misallocation of housing due to search frictions decreases.